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We discuss economic rationales behind peering decisions in the Internet. In
the ﬁrst part of the paper we analyze the decision about a bilateral peering
agreement between two commercial Internet service providers (ISPs) who
are in Cournot competition. In the second part we discuss multilateral peer-
ing between commercial ISPs and an academic research network (ARN).
The latter is organized as club of academics who share the cost of their net-
work. It is discussed whether peering threatens the existence of the ARN
and under what circumstances a commercial ISP would want to use strate-
gic pricing to win all ARN-members as customers.
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1 Introduction
Interconnection among all parties is one of the main features of the Internet.
Every computer connected to the Internet is able to communicate with any
other computer on this network. This communication takes place by send-
ing data “packets” back and forward between both machines. Along its way,
a packet typically passes several “routers” that determine which way it has
to take. This can be a quite winding path; e.g., it is not untypical in Europe
that Internet trafﬁc between two computers in the same city but on different
networks is routed via the United States. 
Typically, such a detour implies a lower quality of service: transfering the
same amount of data takes longer and response times (the so-called
“latency”) increases. While this does not matter very much for e-mail, it is
an important factor for interactive activities like working on a remote com-
puter via telnet sessions or surﬁng the Internet. Such delays can often be
avoided when Internet service providers (ISPs)1 agree upon an additional,
usually local, interconnection between their networks so that trafﬁc between
them does not have to be routed through the Internet cloud (ﬁgure 1).
Figure 1: The Interconnection Decision
Such interconnection agreements can be bilateral as well as multilateral. In
addition, multilateral exchanges can either consist of a central router to
which all networks are connected, as is the case in most Commercial Inter-
net Exchanges (CIX) or they can constitute special high-speed networks, as
the Metropolitan Area Exchanges (MAE) in the United States. 2
1. ISPs in this paper are deﬁned as organizations providing a basic connec-
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Most CIX and bilateral arrangements are based on cost-sharing agreements:
every ISP pays for his own cost of accessing the interconnection point while
the costs for the routing equipment are shared. Both direct costs are usually
negligible compared to the total cost of running a network. All participants
agree to accept all Internet trafﬁc addressed to their network without any
further charge. This mutual agreement is called “peering”. Such agreements
are thus based on a “sender keeps all” settlement, which distinguishes them
from most telephony interconnection agreements (
 
Farnon/Hurdle, 1997).
In addition to the performance improvement, such a peering agreement also
eases the trafﬁc on the ISPs main lines into the “Internet cloud”. For Euro-
pean ISPs this line is usually a rather expensive intercontinental connection
to some ISP in the USA, to whom the European ISP is only customer, not
peer and has to pay for the interconnection service.
According to this argument, a peering agreement seems to be of mutual
advantage at ﬁrst sight. However, there do exist some arguments against
peering agreements. Two reasons are frequently mentioned by larger ISPs
which at least are points against peering with smaller providers. The ﬁrst
can be called “backbone free-riding”. A national ISP A, e.g., has to build up
and maintain a backbone network connecting the different regions, while an
ISP B concentrating on a single region does not. If boths ISPs agree to peer-
ing, B uses A’s backbone capacity for free to exchange trafﬁc with A’s cus-
tomers in distant regions. 
The second reason could be called the “business-stealing effect”. Consider a
customer of a large ISP A, whose main sites of interest are also customers of
the same ISP. For most of his Internet usage, the customer will enjoy a good
quality of service in the form of low latency. By switching to a smaller ISP B
who, for whatever reason, is cheaper and which is not directly connected to
network A, the customer would usually have to accept a higher latency
when accessing his favorite sites on A’s network. With a peering agreement
between A and B this barrier to switching falls and A might lose customers
to B. Thus, the decision whether to peer has to take into account all of these
possible consequences. While advantageous from the point of view of the
customer, ISPs might be reluctant to peer.
2. Bailey (1997) distinguishes between peer-to-peer bilateral, hierarchical 
bilateral, third-party administrated and cooperative Internet intercon-
nection agreements.– 3 –
In the history of the Internet, peering has traditionally been one of the main
modes of interconnection.3 Recently, however, larger ISPs in the USA have
terminated several peering agreements. In April 1997 UUNET, one of the
major ISPs in the US, announced that it will only continue peering with ISPs
that meet certain minimum requirements with respect to their backbone
capacity and their quality of service. Already in January MCI, another major
ISP, announced a similar policy: it only continues to peer with “national
level networks” that also meet certain technical criteria. Most major ISPs in
the United States are following this route. 
The mentioned criteria are usually only met by other large ISPs, so that
effectively the peering agreements between these major and small, often
only local, ISPs have been cancelled. Such small ISPs have been offered the
status of a customer, meaning that they are now being charged for the inter-
connection service. Within the Internet community, this change of policy has
caused an outcry (Bielski, 1997).
 
 Also the FCC started investigating, which
role its telecommunications regulation should play for Internet services
(Werbach, 1997).
Within Germany, a somewhat related case has been ﬁercely debated during
1997. The major commercial ISPs have set up a Commercial Internet
Exchange, which is organized as a multilateral peering agreement. The com-
mercial ISPs would like to see the academic research network provided by
the DFN to participate in the mutual peering arrangement. Currently this
network hosts a considerable number of Germany’s computers connected to
the Internet and a large amount of all German Internet trafﬁc starts or ends
there. 
However, the DFN declined to participate in any peering arrangement.
Instead, it suggests that ISPs who want to be well connected to the DFN-net-
work become (commercial) customers of the DFN. For the ISPs that means
that they not only have to bear the full technical interconnection costs
(leased lines, computing equipment) but in addition are charged for this
access considerably more than research institutions (Heese 1997). This “peer-
ing battle” was fought in the newspapers for almost a year, until the parties
settled for a compromise in late 1997. The DFN will participate in the CIX,
although it will be compensated for doing so by the commercial ISPs for
whom this agreement is still cheaper than the previous rules.
3. For a data-rich overview of Internet interconnection agreements in the 
USA cf. Srinagesh (1997).– 4 –
This behavior of large Internet service providers motivates our paper. While
at ﬁrst sight refusing peering agreements seems to stand in stark contrast to
possible gains in form of larger customer satisfaction (and thus price) and in
form of less international interconnection capacity needed (and thus cost
savings), we have also shown some reasons why certain ISPs might want to
refrain from peering. In this paper, we want to model the peering decision
and to isolate the different factors of inﬂuence. 
This is done in two steps: We ﬁrst investigate the decision about a bilateral
peering agreement between two commercial ISPs who are in Cournot com-
petition. In a second step we discuss multilateral peering between the com-
mercial ISPs and an academic research network (ARN). The latter is
organized as a club of academics who share the cost of their network. Spe-
cial attention is given to the question, whether peering may threaten the
existence of this club.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the basic
model is set up and in section 3 the peering decision is discussed. Section 4
investigates peering between the academic network and commercial ISPs
and section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
Our model is based on two rather simple Internet service providers. Both
providers are in Cournot competition with each other. Each provider con-
nects his customers with a high-quality backbone. Since this paper discusses
the Internet, both networks are interconnected in some way. We assume that
interconnection initially is achieved by a link of much lower quality than the
network’s backbone. One might want to think of this link as the usual USA
connection the typical European Internet service provider has. 
We consider a scenario where a) the interconnection quality can be
improved by direct peering agreements between the two ISPs, and b) a
direct peering agreement  c.p. decreases network costs for the ISP. As justiﬁ-
cation for the latter think of two German ISPs exchanging a substantial
ammount of trafﬁc via their USA connection. The question we want to
answer is, under which circumstances both ISPs would be willing to agree
to bilateral peering.– 5 –
2.1 Assumptions
We assume the existence of two ISPs,   and  . The inverse demand func-
tions for access to ISP  ‘s network   are assumed as:
(1)
In this inverse demand function   and   denote the number of users con-
nected to the respective networks. The ﬁrst term in the function,  , captures
the pure quantity effect. The larger the total number of Internet users, the
lower the price as users with a lower willigness to pay join the Internet:
. In addition a network effect, modelled by  , exists. The larger the
number of users, the larger each user’s utility from being on the Internet
and the higher is her willingness to pay:  . 
We distinguish the size of the network effect   and   for both networks
where each   is a measure for the peceived network size from the point of
view of a customer on the respective network. The number of customers on
the second network  – who can only be reached with lower quality – is dis-
counted by a factor  . The better the quality of interconnection between
both ISPs, the larger  .
If there is no direct interconnection between both networks, the interconnec-
tion quality is at its lower level,  . A peering agreement increases   up to
its upper bound   where users do not experience any difference
between accessing resoures on their own and on the other network.
For provider  ‘s cost function we assume 
(2) .
Costs for an ISP increase with a rise in the number of Internet users on their
network ( ). Also an additional user on network   will raise costs on
the network   ( ). This is due to the fact that the Internet networks are
always interconnected, even if the interconnection is via the Internet cloud.
This additional user will at least sometimes access information on the net-
work  , not only producing trafﬁc on  ’s backbone but also on his connec-
tion between the two networks.
On the other hand, ISPs can decrease their costs by deciding to peer
( ). Generally, the costs for setting up an interconnection point for two
networks are rather low, especially if both providers serve the same region
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reduction in the necessary capacity for the connection into the Internet
cloud are rather high. This assumption requires that existing customers of
network   do not access considerably more information on network   when
the interconnection quality improves. Otherwise the additional costs due to
‘s customers accessing resources on  ‘s network might overcompensate
the cost savings from fewer intercontinental lines. While   does not
change the model’s outcome considerably, we regard   as the more
interesting case. The model implications also do not change if we account
for a ﬁxed interconnection cost  .
2.2 Proﬁt Maximization
Each ISP maximizes its proﬁts given by 
(3)
taken as given the network size of the second provider. Thus the ﬁrst-order
condition for provider   is given as
(4) .
Condition (4) yields the optimal network size   as a function of the
size of the second network and the interconnection quality. The second-
order condition to be met is   as we assume interior solutions. The
reaction functions for provider  can be obtained in the usual way from the
ﬁrst-order condition (4) as:
(5)  and  .
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3 The Peering Decision of Commercial ISPs
The peering decision in our model is a decision about interconnection qual-
ity  . Both commercial ISPs will agree to peer if they can increase their prof-
its by this agreement. If both providers are in equilibrium initially, the
condition to be met for making a peering agreement proﬁtable can be
derived from equation (3) by using the envelope theorem:
(6)
However, it is not possible to derive general conditions for preferences and
technology from (6) under which peering is proﬁtable or unproﬁtable.
Therefore we proceed by ﬁrst analyzing the different factors determining
the outcome of equation (6) and subsequently discussing some examples by
simulation.
First of all, the right-hand side of equation (6) can be divided into three
parts: The ﬁrst term,  , captures the direct effect of a change in intercon-
nection quality   on  ‘s proﬁts. The second part,  , is the indirect effect
of a change in the competitor’s network size on  ’s own proﬁt. And, ﬁnally,
the last part   contains the reaction of the other provider’s optimal net-
work size when   changes.
The direct effect of an increase in interconnection quality is given by
 and is positive by our assumptions about costs and prefer-
ences. Apart from the network sizes, its value is determined by cost as well
as by price derivatives. It is the former, which are mainly pointed out by
proponents of peering agreements. Since  , an increase in   raises 
through this channel and thus increases the chances that peering is proﬁt-
able. The more elastic costs are with respect to an increase in   (the smaller
), the larger this effect and the larger  : The chances that peering is
proﬁtable rise.
The network effect captured by   determines the second reaction. A
rise in   increases the perceived network size   for  ‘s customers and thus
c.p. the price they are willing to pay for their Internet usage. This effect
becomes less important as the total size of both networks and the quality of
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The second term   in condition (6) consists of two parts. Consider
 ﬁrst. From the ﬁrst order condition (4) for 
follows that   which leads to   since
prices are set above marginal cost. A rise in the competitor’s network size
decreases  ‘s proﬁts. 
Just like the direct effect also the indirect one  can be split into two parts, a
cost effect as well as a price effect. As for the cost effect,   falls in  ,
i.e., in the cost increase for provider   induced by an additional user on net-
work   who also produces trafﬁc on  ‘s network. This cost effect might be
especially important if “backbone free-riding” is a serious issue. If, for
example, ISP   is regionally dispersed, she incurrs large costs from extend-
ing the capacity of her large and expensive backbone to cope with the addi-
tional trafﬁc from an increase in  . For a regional provider, these costs are
usually much lower.
The price effect in   is driven by the Cournot competition. If   increases
her network size, provider   has to adjust its price to keep her network size
. The strength of this effect depends on the price derivatives. The larger
 and the smaller  , the lower is also  . In the crucial case of
 < 0 both effects raise the chances of peering being proﬁtable. Note that
the effect of   works in the same direction as above with  .
Since  , the sign of the second term in (6) is determined by the sign
of  . Hence, the smaller  , the higher the chances that peering is
proﬁtable. If this term is negative, peering will always be proﬁtable.
Under reasonable assumptions such a decrase in the competitor’s network
size will be accompanied by an extension of one’s own network: Taking the
total derivative of provider  ’s ﬁrst-order condition, which has to equal zero
in equilibrium, leads to
.
Combining this with equation (5) for provider   implies
.
With the additional assumptions of reaction functions falling in the oppo-
nent’s network size ( ) and rising in interconnection quality
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Hence, while in such a situation peering decreases  ‘s network size, it
increases  ‘s network – certainly a potential source of conﬂict that has been
discussed as “business stealing” in the introduction. However, it is easy to
see from condition (6) that peering might still be proﬁtable despite losing
market share. Even if provider   loses customers to  , peering might still be
advantageous for her if only her proﬁt decrease   from the rise in the
other provider’s network size is not too large. In this case the positive direct
effect   dominates.
Summarizing the different elements determining the peering decision, we
can conclude that this decsion is not only inﬂuenced by cost but also by
price effects. While large cost savings from fewer intercontinental lines raise
the chances of peering being proﬁtable, a large cost sensitiveness to
increases in the competitor’s network size decreases the chances. The latter
is usually more important for large, regionally dispersed providers than for
small ones. However, even if costs would increase from interconnection,
proﬁts need not fall since customers are willing to pay for the increased net-
work size.
The combined inﬂuence of the different effects mentioned can best be
shown by calculating some numerical examples. For doing this, we have
chosen the following inverse demand function:
as well as the cost functions
,
which both satisfy the above restrictions on costs and preferences.
Consider ﬁrst the baseline setting of identical providers. In this setting the
equilibrium is symmetric and both providers either unanimously favor
peering or reject peering. Given the above demand and cost functions, both
ISPs will agree to peer for most parameter values. Figure 1 shows how net-
work size and proﬁt change for both providers as the level of interconnec-
tion quality rises from   to  . We have chosen an initial value
greater zero for   since there is always some low-quality interconnection in
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Figure 1: Symmetric Solution
Next consider providers with different cost structures. We assume for this
example that the ﬁrst provider has lower marginal costs for each network
size ( ). Figure 2 shows ﬁrst of all that the low-cost provider will
be larger and more proﬁtable.
Figure 2: Differences in Cost Structure
b
 
2 0.046 =– 11 –
Starting with  , the second provider would prefer any increase in
interconnection quality to her current state. For the ﬁrst provider the out-
come of her peering decision depends very much on the actual interconnec-
tion level chosen. Up to rather high levels of   proﬁts are lower than in the
start position. Only with a very high interconnection quality are proﬁts
higher than initially.
Note that the ﬁrst ISP’s network size   decreases in  . However, even
with a decreasing network size and market share her proﬁts rise if intercon-
nection quality is above a certain level, which is due to cost savings and
price increases. The latter have been made possible by the higher quality of
the interconnected network.
Note also that in this example network size changes as well as proﬁt
changes are much smaller for the ﬁrst than for the second provider. Even if
perfect interconnection is not possible for some reason, the second provider
could therefore use part of his increase in proﬁts from better interconnection
to compensate the ﬁrst for his fall in proﬁts.
Figure 3: Low Network Importance
We have already pointed out above that the network effect can possibly
become very important as it may lead to higher proﬁts despite a falling mar-
ket share. Figure 3 illustrates this. Parameter values are the same as for ﬁg-
ure 2, except that now   which corresponds to a lower willingness
to pay for an increase in perceived network size,  . In this scenario, the












ond provider could again compensate her competitor for the proﬁt fall just
like in the previous scenario.
The importance of the network effect is probably one of the main differences
between consumer and business networks. It is reasonable to assume that
business users generally have a higher willigness to pay for a high quality
interconnection than users who only send e-mail and do some occasional
surﬁng. Thus for the question whether peering will take place between
“business networks”, this effect is probably more important than for the
same question concerning “consumer networks”.
4 Peering between Academic and Commercial ISPs
In the previous section we have discussed the peering decision for commer-
cial ISPs which are in Cournot competition with each other. However, com-
mercial ISPs are a rather new group on the Internet, which has started out as
a network of academic research networks (ARNs) based on cost sharing.
Therefore an ARN might consider the above discussion as not appropriate
since it does not consider itself being a commercial network. In fact, one of
the “peering battles” set out in the introduction, that between the German
academic research network DFN and a group of commercial ISPs is exactly
such a case where the group of commercial ISPs was already peering and
wanted the DFN to join this multilateral peering agreement.
We will therefore discuss in this section the peering decision in such a sce-
nario, where one side is commercial and the other is based on cost-sharing.
Our basic setup for this question will constitute of two identical commercial
providers, who already are perfectly interconnected on one side and of a
“club”, the academic research network (ARN) on the other side. The latter is
non-proﬁt and based on cost sharing. While members of the ARN are able to
leave the club and get connected by one of the commercial providers, cus-
tomers of the latter can not become members of the ARN. Since members
can always leave, it is also interesting to know, whether peering might
increase this incentive and thus lead to dissolution of the ARN.
We start out with a situation where the ARN already exists due to some his-
toric event not further discussed. It consists of   homogeneous members.
The two commercial providers are in a symmetric equilibrium with perfect
interconnetion as discussed in section 3. The ARN is initially connected to
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Each individual member can always leave the ARN. It will decide to do so if
its utility from being a customer of an ISP is larger than from remaining in
the academic network, given that the other members remain with the ARN.
We assume that an academic’s total utlity – when being a member of the
ARN – is given by a function depending on the perceived network size of
his academic community   as well as of the commercial Internet com-
munity   and diminished by his cost share.
If the member switches to one of the ISPs, it has to accept this ISP’s price 
instead of a cost share. In addition it gains a perfect Internet connection to
customers of the commercial ISPs while the connection to his research fel-
lows is of a lesser quality. Thus, his utility becomes
We assume that   is large so that the member’s switching decision only has
a negligible inﬂuence on  .
Given these utility functions, the member will remain with the ARN as long
as  . Thus, existence of the ARN requires that
(7) .
Given that condition (7) holds, we assume that the ARN maximizes its
member’s utility. We will not discuss possible principle-agent problems
between members and management nor any other possible objectives of the
ARN’s management besides the one assumed.
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4.1 The Peering Decision
As before, the commercial ISPs will favor peering if it increases their proﬁts.
Since interconnection between boths ISPs is perfect and the peering decision
concerns interconnection with the ARN, their change in proﬁts is now given
by
(8)
As both ISPs are symmetric, (8) can be transformed to yield the following
condition for proﬁtable peering:
.
In comparison, the ARN will agree to peer if it can increase its members’
utility. This is the case if
(9) .
For the commercial ISPs the peering decision is very similar to that dis-
cussed above. The term   contains the inﬂuence of the ARN’s size.
The larger this network, the more do ISPs favor peering. The second term
 is now the cost decrease from better interconnection between academic
and commercial network. Finally, the third large term contains an effect one
would tend to neglect at ﬁrst sight: the interconnection decision and the
subsequent increase in the total size of the perceived network change the
optimal network size for both ISPs. Basically, the increase in interconnection
quality   shifts the inverse demand curve   upwards. It thus works like an
exogenous demand increase and – at least in general – raises  . Just like in
the previous section, ISP   has to take into account the inﬂuence of the
changing   on his own proﬁtability. 
The ARN has to take into account a utility effect as well as a cost effect. Since
we have assumed  , the combined size of the commercial networks,
, as well as its change,  , positively inﬂuence the chances of peering.
The size of this effect depends on the inﬂuence of the commercial ISPs net-
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works as one would expect:   works in favor of peering,   against
it. The inﬂuence of the latter depends on the peering-induced change in  .
Note that the ARN should agree to peering, even if such an agreement
implies larger costs for its members, as long as the increase in utility is large
enough to meet condition (9).
In the mentioned peering battle betwenn DFN and a group of commercial
ISPs in Germany much of the debate concerned the quantity of the derived
effects. The commercial ISPs asserted that   is of considerable size for
the ARN since its members access considerable amounts of information on
the commercial networks. Furthermore they suggested that cost savings
from peering would be large for both peering parties. However, the research
network questioned the cost savings, neglected the possible utility gains
and instead pointed to  . As the research network is large and con-
tains a lot of useful information, so they argued, peering would ease access
to this material, thus making the commercial networks more valuable. In
our model this corresponds to a relatively large  .
4.2 Does Peering Threaten the Existence of the ARN?
In our model ARN members might leave their club at any time and switch
to a commercial Internet provider. An interesting question is therefore,
whether peering increases their incentive to do so by decreasing the advan-
tages from being a member of the ARN. The question is, how condition (7)
changes, as ISPs and ARN agree to peering. It is obvious that this existence
threat is larger, the smaller the left hand-side of condition (7) and the larger
the right hand-side.
Consider the right hand-side ﬁrst, where a change in   has the following
effect:
.
Assume that  , which will generally be the case as we have pointed
out above. Then the second term on the right is negative by the ﬁrst-oder
conditions for  . The third term is positive. The sign of the ﬁrst term, and
thus the overall effect of peering on average cost in the ARN depends on  .
If the cost savings from peering are rather small, as the ARN suspects, aver-
age costs will rise and so will the whole expression. 
A relatively large marginal effect of peering on the commercial ISPs’ com-
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First of all it will lead to larger average costs for the ARN members. And
second it will lead to lower prices in the commercial part of the Internet,
making switching more advantageous.
Last, a large club size   implies a rather small right hand-side of (7) if the
network effect is important, as the commercial price will be higher the larger
. Thus it will stabilize the ARN.
For the left hand-side we get
.
With the above assumptions on the derivatives of   it is clear that a small
 as well as a large   make this expression small and increase the exist-
ence threat on an ARN agreeing to peer. If   is large, an academic looses a
large amount of utility when switching to a commercial provider. Thus, also
his gains from an increase in   are much higher than with a small  . Like-
wise, if   is small, an increase in interconnection quality raises utility for a
member of the ARN by a smaller amount than if the size of the commercial
ISPs were larger. Note that the size of   works in the opposite direction as
above.
Finally, the effect of   on the left hand-side is not clear. It depends on the
size of  ,   and  . With   increasing to one and the derivatives not
too different, one would suppose that its inﬂuence is small, if present at all.
Summarizing the discussion, one can say that peering might indeed
threaten the existence of the academic research network. The chances for
such a threat will be larger if the cost savings from peering in the ARN are
small, if the commercial networks gain considerably in size from peering
and if their combined size is nevertheless not too large.
4.3 Strategic Pricing by Commercial ISPs
Even if the ARN remains in existence in the scenario just discussed, the
commercial ISPs might have an incentive to use pricing as a strategic instru-
ment to dissolve the ARN by winning all ARN members as customers of
their commercial network. In this section we will discuss whether a change
in the quality of interconnection will inﬂuence the decision of the commer-
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To keep things as simple as possible, we introduce two further assumptions:
First, we assume that only one provider,  , will use strategic pricing to win
the ARN members as customers and the second provider behaves just like
before. Second, we assume that price discrimination is possible and   can
offer a different price to ARN members than to non-ARN members. The
price for the latter is, just like before, the outcome of the Cournot competi-
tion for non-academics. We assume that these prices are derived sequen-
tially. First,   will make its strategic pricing decision and afterwards it will
engage in Cournot competition with   for the non-ARN members.
ISP   only has an incentive to use strategic pricing for winning the ARN’s
members as customers if she can increase her proﬁts by doing so. The ISP
can only win the members if these are indifferent between either remaining
in the ARN or switching alltogether to the commercial ISP, thereby dissolv-
ing the ARN. This is the case if 
(10) ,
where   is the number of non-academic customers at provider   and   is
the discriminatory price for academics on the commercial network. 
Since the provider is able to discriminate between academic and non-aca-
demic customers, she will choose the connection price for academics such
that equation (10) is met. The price for non-academic customers will be
given by (1) where   and   are such that
(11) .
Provider  ‘s proﬁt will be given as
.
Note that the cost function no longer depends on   since the ARN has
ceased to exist and both commercial providers are perfectly interconnected.
For the second ISP proﬁts and optimal network size are given by 
with   given equivalent to (11). Provider   maximizes her proﬁts taken 
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The ﬁrst-oder condition for network   leads to its equilibrium quantity of
non-academic customers, 
In the remainder we will only consider the interior solution where  .
Whether ISP   will pursue this pricing strategy will depend on  , the dis-
criminatory price it has to offer the ARN-members. This price depends
again on the current state of interconnection,  , as condition (10) shows. We
can therefore ask, whether an increase in   raises potential proﬁts from stra-
tegic pricing and thus the chances that this strategy is chosen. This deriva-
tion can be obtained from  ‘s proﬁt equation, taking into account (10) as:
.
Compare this, however, to the ARN’s condition for agreeing to peering. This
condition (9) can be transformed into
.
Thus, if condition (9) is met and the ARN agrees to peering, than any
increase in interconnection quality   decreases the proﬁtability for ISP   of
taking over the ARN’s customers. Therefore an agreement to peering pro-
tects the ARN from dissolution. This means of course also that the chances
of such an unfriendly take-over are larger, when the ARN could increase its
member’s utility by agreeing to peer but does not do so.
Compared to the previous subsection, the consequences of peering for the
existence of the ARN are just contrary. It can protect itself from strategic
pricing by a commercial ISPs with peering, but under not unrealistic
assumptions increases the chance that its members switch to the commercial
provider without any further incentive. 
However, the Cournot price   for voluntary switching to the commercial
provider has to fall below the strategic price  , as a comparison of condi-
tions (7) and (10) shows. The member’s decision discussed in 4.2 is an indi-
vidual decision and the member has to take into account the disutility from
reaching his research fellows with a poorer quality. To compensate for this
disutility, the price has to be lower than in the case of strategic pricing,
where all menbers switch at the same time. Thus the strategic pricing threat
is stronger and it is therefore still the best strategy for the ARN to agree to
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In this paper we have discussed economic rationales behind peering deci-
sions in the Internet. The ﬁrst part of the paper was concerned with bilateral
peering between commercial ISPs which are in Cournot competition, while
the second part concerned multilateral peering among commercial ISPs and
an academic research network based on cost sharing.
While it is not possible to derive unambiguous conditions for peering to be
favorable, we have shown that certain conditions and constellations are
more favorable to peering than others. 
In a peering decision between commercial ISPs, large cost savings, e.g. from
fewer intercontinental lines, raise the chances of peering being proﬁtable. In
the opposite direction works a large cost sensitiveness to increases in the
competitor’s network size. The latter effect is usually more important for
large, regionally dispersed providers than for small ones. 
While it might be the case that customers leave for another, cheaper pro-
vider, when their ISP starts peering with this cheaper provider, the “busi-
ness-stealing effect” mentioned in the introduction, the resulting feasible
price raises justiﬁed by customers’ willingness to pay for the increased net-
work size might even be strong enough to compensate a provider for the
resulting revenue loss.
For the peering decision between an academic research network the cost
effects work in the same direction. While an increased interconnection qual-
ity does not yield higher proﬁts in this environment, it increases the ARN
members utility from being a member of the network and should therefore
been taken into account.
For the ARN is especially important, whether peering might threaten its
existence. We have shown that this might indeed be the case. The chances
for such a threat will be larger if the cost savings from peering in the ARN
are small, if the commercial networks gain considerably in size from peering
and if their combined size is nevertheless not too large.
However, a peering agreement decreases the proﬁtability for a commercial
ISP of using strategic pricing to win all members of the ARN as customers.
We have shown that this strategic pricing constitutes a stronger threat to the
existence of the ARN and that it therefore should agree to a peering arrange-
ment if that increases its members’ utility. However, the interconnection
quality should not be chosen too high.– 20 –
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